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THE AMERICAN WORKER: JUNIOR PARTNER IN SUCCESS
AND SENIOR PARTNER IN FAILURE
Charles B. Craver
Merrifield Research Professor
George Washington University Law School
   Bradford Technologies (BT) announced record earnings last Friday, causing BT 
stock prices to rise 13 percent. The Board of Directors announced yesterday that
BT President J.P. Watson’s base salary would be increased by 25 percent to
$12,500,000, and he was granted a special $5,000,000 bonus. The Board also
announced a 2.5 percent cost-of-living increase for all BT employees, but approved
employee health plan modifications raising the deductible and co-payment figures.
   Charles Technologies (CT) announced greater than expected losses last Friday,
causing CT stock prices to fall 9.6 percent. After CT President C.B. Wood indicated
yesterday morning that CT would immediately lay off 3000 employees to reduce
operating costs, CT stock prices rose 11 percent. To reward President Wood for his
courageous leadership, the CT Board of Directors voted this morning to provide him
with a $3,000,000 bonus. At the same meeting, the Board approved President Wood’s 
recommendation that employee wages be frozen and that workers be required to
assume a greater share of rising health coverage costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the United States has enjoyed the greatest sustained economic
growth in history. Despite recent stock reversals, the Dow Jones average has risen ten-fold from
1,000 in 1980 to approximately 10,000 today.1 Individuals who purchased shares of stock to
finance business expansion have reaped the benefits of business success. Corporate leaders have
also been well rewarded for their efforts. CEOs of large firms who earned about forty times the
annual salaries of regular workers twenty-five years ago now earn about 475 times average
employee salaries.2  These managers have directly shared in the success of their companies.
Average workers have not shared in the success of business firms. Over the past twenty
years, real employee earnings have remained relatively flat, with their modest wage increases
merely keeping up with cost-of-living increases. These individuals have clearly been the junior
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partners in firm success. 
When corporations have experienced economic set-backs, employees have been the first
to be cut. Company managers have reacted to poor profit reports with quick layoff
announcements designed to reduce costs, bolster public confidence, and boost stock prices. Over
the past five to ten years, many leading companies have effectuated layoffs of 1000, 3000, 5000,
or even 10,000 workers. When these reductions were announced, shareholder value often rose
along with CEO compensation packages. In many cases, the firms ultimately rehired some of the
laid off personnel, or they retained contingent workers from temporary agencies to fill needed
positions. Often company profits did not actually increase as a result of these managerial
changes, but share prices and CEO compensation did. The lower level employees were clearly
the senior partners in firm declines.
A.  Impact of Declining Unionization
Why have corporate employees failed to share significantly in firm successes, and why
have they borne an excessive portion of  firm declines?  These phenomena can be directly
attributed to the decline of representative labor organizations over the past two decades. When
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935,3 which provided employees
with the right to form labor organizations and to designate labor unions as their exclusive
bargaining agents with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions, it thought that this
statute would provide workers with the opportunity to influence management decisions affecting
their basic employment conditions. In Section 1 of the new law, Congress explicitly recognized
“[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association . . . and employers who are organized in the corporate [form].”4 Through resort to
3collective action, workers were expected to share decision-making authority with their corporate
employers.
When the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the NLRA, it similarly
acknowledged the need for concerted employee action to counter-balance the economic
advantage enjoyed by corporate firms.
[A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. . . . [H]e was dependent
ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. . . . [I]f the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable
to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment . . .5
Congress clearly believed that collective action by workers would enable them to participate
meaningfully in firm management.
The enactment of the NLRA and the formation of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) spurred rapid union growth. As CIO unions organized heavy industries such
as steel, automobile, and electrical manufacturing, membership in labor organizations expanded.
By 1940, there were 8,717,000 union members, comprising 26.9 percent of all nonagricultural
workers.6 By 1954, union membership exceeded 17,000,000, constitutting 35 percent of
nonagricultural employees.
By the early 1960s, organized labor began to experience a relative decline in membership,
as the growth of the overall labor force outpaced that of union ranks.7 Heavy industries in the
organized Northeast and Midwest were no longer expanding, and many people and jobs relocated 
from Snow Belt states to Sun Belt areas in the South and Southwest.8 The American economy
was transformed from industrial and manufacturing jobs to primarily white-collar and service
occupations staffed by individuals unreceptive to union entreaties. In addition, overt employer
4opposition to labor unions increased as business firms forced to compete in global markets
concluded that the increased labor costs associated with collective bargaining relationships
undermined their economic viability. Throughout the 1980s, labor organization membership
declined significantly. In 1990, private sector unions had only 10,260,000 members – a mere 12.1
percent of nonagricultural employees. By 2001, private sector union membership had fallen to
9,113,000, comprising 9 percent of nonagricultural workers.9 If this trend continues, the private
sector union density rate (percentage of nonagricultural workers in labor organizations) may fall
to 5 percent or below within the next decade, rendering unions irrelevant outside of limited
industries.10
The decline in union membership has directly diminished the rights of organized workers
and indirectly undermined the rights of unorganized personnel. Employees with bargaining
agents have enhanced their individual economic benefits.11 Organized employees not only enjoy
higher wages than unrepresented workers, but also more generous fringe benefit coverage. As
union density has declined, however, competitive pressures have caused unionized firms to
moderate wage increases and decrease fringe benefit protections. Nonunion companies that
traditionally maintained wage and benefit packages commensurate with those of their unionized
competitors to avoid union organizing campaigns no longer feel the pressure to be so generous.
Representative unions have not only provided members with enhanced economic
benefits. Through the “collective voice” exerted by organized groups, employees have advanced
important noneconomic interests.12 For example, while most American workers are employed on
an “at will” basis, under which they may be terminated at any time for good cause, bad cause, or
no cause, union contracts generally preclude discipline except for “just cause.” Other bargaining
5agreement provisions typically establish orderly layoff and recall procedures, and require the
application of relatively objective criteria to promotional opportunities. If bargaining unit
personnel are not satisfied with the way their employer applies bargaining agreement terms, they
may invoke formal grievance-arbitration procedures. If labor and management representatives
cannot negotiate mutually acceptable resolutions, the union may ask neutral arbitrators to decide
the controverted issues. Without the rights established through the collective bargaining process,
such orderly and neutral grievance adjustment systems would not exist as extensively as they do
today.13
As the percentage of unionized employers declined, business firms began to experience
more frequent external legal constraints. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the
collective bargaining process determined most private sector employment conditions for
organized firms. Individual employers negotiated with local union officials over the wages,
hours, and working conditions applicable to their particular employees. When unique
circumstances warranted special treatment, the bargaining parties  accommodated each other’s
competing interests. As union membership shrank, employers got the freedom to dictate their
employment conditions. Although business entities appreciated the absence of labor union
influence, legislative and judicial developments filled the power void created by the decline of
organized labor.
Over the past three decades, increased external regulation of employment environments 
counterbalanced the decreasing power of private sector unions, as unrepresented workers 
demanded enhanced rights and protections. Various civil rights enactments prohibit
discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.
6Employers must maintain employment environments that meet federal and state health and safety
requirements. Pension programs must satisfy federally-prescribed vesting and investment rules,
and firms must provide workers with advanced notice of mass layoffs and plant closures.
Employers may no longer give polygraph examinations to workers, and individuals with parental
or family emergencies must be given unpaid leaves.
Judicial intervention similarly restricted managerial freedom. Shocking employee
termination cases induced judges in most states to create a public policy exception to the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine, precluding discharges for reasons that contravene
important public policies. Courts increasingly hold employers liable for discharges that
contravene express or implied contractual limitations set forth in personnel policies or employee
performance review procedures. Future judicial developments will further erode employer
freedom in this critical area.
If employers continue to determine fundamental employment conditions unilaterally with
no real input from the affected employees, legislative and judicial intervention will become even
more common. As federal and state legislatures discover areas of significant abuse, usually at the
hands of a few aberrant firms, new statutory provisions will be enacted that will further restrict
managerial freedom. Judges appalled by egregious employer behavior will similarly act to protect
employee interests, even though the resulting doctrines will constrain employers that do not treat
their workers badly.
B.  Need tor More Individualized Employer-Employee Relations
Employer representatives frequently complain about the increasing legislative and judicial
regulation of employment relationships. They claim the inappropriate behavior of a few fringe
7companies has generated intrusive federal and state rules that unreasonably restrict the
managerial freedom of mainstream firms. They maintain that rational employers do not overtly
discriminate or make personnel decisions based on improper considerations, noting that such
conduct would be economically inefficient.14 The cost of replacing skilled employees with firm-
specific training is so high that corporate leaders would not irrationally sever beneficial
employment relationships and risk placing their firms at a competitive disadvantage.15
American business officials regularly maintain that human capital is their most important
resource. They claim to treat their workers fairly and generously, because satisfied employees are
loyal and productive workers. To enhance employer-employee relationships, many U.S.
companies have created shop level employee involvement programs designed to facilitate
communication between managers and employees, to improve product or service quality, and to
increase worker productivity.16 Many corporate leaders are concerned that recent National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) decisions have jeopardized the legality of employee involvement
programs by ruling that such plans constitute “labor organizations” dominated by employers in
contravention of the NLRA. To counteract the impact of these negative NLRB decisions,
business officials have sought enactment of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act
(“TEAM Act”), which would provide companies with greater latitude in this area.
Corporate executives believe that companies need worker participation programs to
increase employee-management communication and to enhance product or service quality and
employee productivity. They recognize that firms in countries like Germany, Japan, and Sweden
have used employee involvement committees to improve competitive positions in global
markets, and would like to achieve similar benefits. American business leaders often complain
8about the lack of employee commitment to firm objectives. They ignore the fact that the
prevailing employment-at-will doctrine and the absence of real worker involvement in the
managerial decision-making process generate employee insecurity.17 Employees reasonably fear
that suggested productivity enhancements will be rewarded – not by greater firm appreciation –
but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers.18 Employees also believe that quality
improvements will increase shareholder equity and managerial bonuses, but have no impact on
basic worker compensation. If corporate leaders wish to improve employee morale, avoid the
further proliferation of intrusive federal and state intervention, and retain greater localized
control over their terms and conditions of employment, they should recognize the potential
benefits to be derived from meaningful worker participation programs.
C.  Lack of Industrial Democracy for Most American Workers
Approaching the twenty-first century, the United States effectively stands alone among
the developed nations, on the verge of having no effective system of worker
representation and consultation. . . . Survey data indicate that some 30 to 40 million
American workers without union representation desire such representation, and some
80 million workers, many of whom do not approve of unions, desire some
independent collective voice in their workplace.19
The U.S. prides itself on being one of the world’s great democracies. Yet, in the private
sector employment environment, democratic principles are denied to the overwhelming majority
of  employees.20 It is time for Congress and business leaders to acknowledge two critical realities.
First, the NLRA has become an irrelevant statute for the vast majority of private sector
employees, evidenced by the continuing decline of private sector union density to below 10
percent. Individual employees must either accept the terms offered by their employers or look for
work elsewhere. For most employees, this “exit voice” is meaningless, because economic
9necessity forces them to remain with employers that refuse to negotiate over basic employment
conditions. Second, corporate success is dependent upon the contributions of three symbiotic
groups: (1) the investors who provide the necessary capital; (2) the managers who provide the
requisite leadership; and (3) the employees who perform the basic job functions.
Corporate laws carefully protect the rights of business investors. Federal and state
securities laws entitle prospective shareholders to extensive information about a company before
they decide whether to purchase shares.21 Shareholders  directly participate in the election of
corporate directors.22 Firm managers owe shareholders a fiduciary duty and are liable to
stockholders who are injured by breaches of this duty.23 Because capital is a highly mobile
commodity, shareholders can protect their interests through diversification and by transferring
their financial support from poorly performing businesses to other investments.
Corporate managers also possess the capacity to protect themselves against corporate
vicissitudes. They enjoy access to confidential information regarding firm performance, and
exercise meaningful discretion with respect to decisions that affect their own futures. They
frequently avoid the insecurity associated with employment-at-will arrangements through
individual employment contracts that guarantee them continued employment for specified terms.
They may obtain generous severance packages to protect themselves from job losses caused by
corporate reorganizations or buyouts. Finally, they benefit from business success through bonus
payments and stock options that are unavailable to most subordinate personnel.
In contrast, rank-and-file employees are generally treated no better than the equipment
they use or operate. Even though they commit their working lives to the success of their
respective firms, employers can terminate them at any time for almost any reason. Employees are
not privy to confidential firm information, nor are they consulted about business decisions that
may directly affect their employment destinies. Furthermore, their continuing economic needs,
pension rights, and length of service frequently induce them to remain with their current
employers during periods of declining firm performance.
Employees feel increasingly isolated and unappreciated.24 Most want the opportunity to
be part of a larger employment community in which they could openly share their ideas and
concerns with their colleagues.25 They want to know how their employer is performing, and wish
to be consulted about firm decisions that affect their employment futures. It is time for both
business leaders and Congress to acknowledge the significant contribution of employees to firm
success and to provide such workers with meaningful industrial democracy. Congress should
create a mechanism that enables employees to share in the economic benefits they help to
generate and provide them with some voice with respect to their employment destinies. Political
and business leaders must recognize that “[t]he essence of industrial democracy is the right of
employees to influence decisions affecting their working lives.”26
This chapter will initially explore worker participation programs in other industrial
countries, and the voluntary plans used by a number of U.S. corporations. It will examine the
different ways these programs permit employees to influence firm decisions both at the shop
level and the corporate level. It will then propose a worker participation model for American
employees that would optimally protect the interests of shareholders, managers, and employees.
II.  WORKER PARTICIPATION MODELS
A. Foreign Practices
A number of European countries have established different forms of employee
involvement plans.  Most include shop level groups that focus on diverse issues ranging from
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narrow production topics to expansive employment considerations.  A few worker participation
programs include employee representatives on corporate boards.  These provide direct worker
input when fundamental corporate decisions affecting employment interests are being made.  It
would be beneficial to briefly review some of the more salient forms of employee involvement.
1.  Germany
Germany has an established history of employee involvement programs.  In 1891, it
enacted the Arbeiterschutzgesetz, which provided company owners with the right to establish
work rules unilaterally.27  If a workers committee existed, however, the owners had to initially
present proposed rules to that committee.28 In 1900, Article 91 of the Bayrisches Berggesetz
created statutorily mandated worker committees for mines with over twenty employees.29  
The Betriebstategesetz, or Works Councils Act of 1920, directed the election of employee
representatives to supervisory boards, and provided for the use of worker committees throughout
German industry.30  In 1972, the Federal Republic of German enacted the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act), that directed the election of works councils
in firms with five or more employees.31  Corporations with 100 employees have five council
members, firms with 500 employees have nine council members, and firms with 1000 employees
have fifteen council members.32 Council representatives are elected every four years by the wage
earners and non-executive salaried employees in proportion to their respective numbers.33  Multi-
plant corporations have central works councils composed of delegates from the establishment-
level councils.34   The vast majority of larger companies have works councils.  In firms that have
not established councils, three or more employees may petition the labor court to create one.35
Although German works councils do not determine basic compensation levels, which are
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established separately through collective bargaining procedures, they do have codetermination
rights with respect to employee bonuses and performance-rated pay.36  They also have
codetermination rights regarding overtime, leaves of absence, vacation plans, and the
introduction of work monitoring devices.37  Management officials must obtain council
concurrence with respect to changes pertaining to these areas, or face the possibility of external
legal challenges.38 Works councils possess limited veto rights concerning such critical issues as
employee transfers, downgrades, and dismissals.39  Impasses in these areas are resolved through
mediation or arbitration by a tripartite conciliation committee or the labor court.40  Works
councils may not engage in work stoppages.41  Works councils have consultation rights with
respect to personnel planning, changes in work procedures, and the introduction of new
technology.42  They are entitled to information pertaining to financial matters of interest to
employees, and they directly participate in the enforcement of health and safety standards.43
Works councils, which function primarily at the local level, are independent of
representative labor organizations that are active at the enterprise and industry levels.44
Nonetheless, the majority of works councillors are union members, and unions frequently
nominate lists of individuals for council positions.45  Labor organizations provide works councils
with information and expertise, and council members work closely with labor officials.46
German business enterprises are governed by a management board (Vorstand) and a
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).47  Daily managerial functions are performed by the
management board.48  The supervisory board is responsible for overseeing the management
board, and appointing and removing members of that body.49  Under the Mitbestimmung
(Codetermination Act) of 1976, one half of the supervisory board members in corporations with
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over 2,000 workers must be elected by the employees.50  In smaller companies, employees elect
one-third of board members.51  Except in the coal and steel industries, in which employee elected
board members possess power equal to that of shareholder elected members, management
officials retain ultimate authority in large corporations.52  This is due to the fact that some board
members are elected by lower level supervisory personnel, and the fact the chair of the
supervisory board, who is empowered to break tie votes, is elected by the stockholders.53
2.  France
Unlike most Western European nations, which have relatively high union membership
rates, union density in France is similar to that of the United States.54  Despite this fact, however,
French workers have enjoyed a reasonable degree of industrial democracy since 1945.  Firms
with more than ten employees are statutorily obliged to have employee elected personnel
delegates.55 Entities with fifty or more employees must also have enterprise committees.56 
Employees enjoy dual representation in French companies through both personnel
delegates/enterprise committees and designated labor unions.57  Despite the low union density
rate, union leaders enjoy expansive power through their ability to nominate personnel delegates
and enterprise committee members.58
Personnel delegates and enterprise committee members perform functions similar to those
performed by German works councillors.  They are authorized to obtain relevant firm
information and be consulted regarding various issue of interest to employees.59  Enterprise
committees focus principally on topics of corporate interest, while personnel delegates
concentrate on local issues pertaining to individual grievances and contract enforcement.60 
Although labor organizations may also represent workers with grievances, their primary function
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is to negotiate collective contracts.61
French collective bargaining was historically conducted on an industry-wide basis, which
enabled unions to minimize inter-firm competition based on labor cost differentials.62  Individual
employers sought to minimize direct union involvement in local affairs through the use of
personnel delegates and enterprise committees.63  Prior to the early 1980s, the role of enterprise
committees was principally advisory.  They were consulted regarding planned firm decisions, but
could only offer suggestions for management consideration.64  The 1982 Auroux reforms
restructured the collective rights of French workers.65  These changes were designed to
decentralize the bargaining process and strengthen the function of enterprise committees.  As a
result, more collective contracts are now negotiated at the firm, rather than the industry, level.66
The Auroux reforms have strengthened the grievance processing role performed by
personnel delegates, and enhanced the authority of enterprise committees.67  Before corporate
managers make significant decisions concerning economic, technological, organizational, or
social matters, they must consult with enterprise committee members.68  These consultation
rights cover such topics as mergers, worker transfers, employee dismissals, economic reductions,
employee training, and the introduction of new technology.69  While corporate leaders may not
make final decisions regarding these subjects without first consulting enterprise committee
members and providing them with the information they require to evaluate proposed changes,
enterprise committees  cannot prevent the post-consultation effectuation of firm plans.70 
Nonetheless, enterprise committees frequently negotiate changes in company proposals that help
protect worker interests.71  Enterprise committees also have the right to information concerning
the financial status of business entities.72
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Worker participation at upper management levels is limited to the appointment by
enterprise committee members of two delegates to corporate boards.73  While these employee
directors can express worker views during board of director deliberations, their function is
entirely advisory.74  
3.  The Netherlands
Dutch law began to require works councils in 1950.75  The initial employee committees
were intended to increase communication between workers and employers.76  At that time,
employers were still able to select the council chairs.77  Following statutory changes in 1979,
firms no longer possessed the power to designate council chairs, and works councils were
provided with expanded advisory and codetermination rights.78  Full works council participation
is mandated for firms with 100 or more employees, with more limited council participation
provided for companies with 35 to 99 employees.79  Works councils are not authorized to
negotiate collective contracts, which are bargained by representative unions on an industry
basis.80
Section 25 of the Works Council Act of 1979 requires covered businesses to consult with
works councils regarding proposed decisions pertaining to such topics as enterprise control,
mergers, takeovers of other firms, significant reductions, plant closures, major organizational
changes, production relocations, major company investments, and the employment of outside
experts.81  When councils oppose employer changes in these areas, companies must postpone
final action for up to thirty days to give firm managers time to reconsider their contemplated
changes.82  Council advice is also mandated with respect to the appointment or dismissal of
members of supervisory boards.83
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Under Section 27, works councils have codetermination rights with regard to working
hours, job evaluations, health and safety matters, staff training, grievance processing, and the
rules applicable to the hiring, firing, and promotion of employees.84  When council members fail
to approve proposals subject to codetermination, the firm may not implement the suggested
actions until it first obtains the consent of a cantonal court which must find that the council’s
disapproval was “unreasonable.”85
Section 28 provides works councils with the authority to monitor firm compliance with
statutory and contractual obligations.86  Council members are especially vigilant with respect to 
possible employment discrimination.87
In highly centralized companies, there may be one works council at the enterprise level,
supplemented by employee committees at local facilities.88  In less centralized enterprises, each
establishment may have its own works council.  Works council elections take place every three
years, and representative labor organizations usually nominate candidates for council positions.89 
Smaller firms have seven council members, while firms with over 1000 employees have twenty-
five councillors.90
Works councils have become established institutions in the Netherlands.91  Council-
employer relations are highly professional, with a minimal degree of adversarial polarization. 
Employers that initially feared that works councils would hinder firm progress have found these
committees to be valuable consulting groups.92  Even though works councils do not conflict with
the bargaining functions performed by representative trade unions, other factors have caused
private sector union density to fall from 37 percent in 1979 to 18 percent today.93
4.  Sweden
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Swedish workers are highly organized, with a union density of approximately 80
percent.94  Unlike other Western European countries that have established worker participation
programs that operate independently from representative trade unions, Swedish cooperative
groups are inextricably intertwined with labor organizations.95  Worker participation committees
were mandated by the Act on Codetermination at Work of 1976.96  This enactment provides local
union committees with the right to obtain relevant firm information and to be consulted on a
wide range of topics related to employment conditions.
Formal collective bargaining in Sweden is carried out on a centralized basis, with
codetermination councils being used at local facilities to monitor contractual compliance.97 
When issues of local import arise, employers must meet with the appropriate codetermination
councils and seek mutual accommodations of their competing interests.98  In the early 1980s,
most codetermination procedures were formal and were conducted through conventional
negotiations.99  In recent years, codetermination discussions have been carried out on a more
informal basis, through regular exchanges between employer and worker representatives.
Swedish employers that initially opposed codetermination obligations now use those
procedures to enhance communication between labor and management.100  They regularly meet
and explore various issues of joint interest.101  The mutual trust and respect which have been
developed have enabled Swedish companies to reduce their workforces, improve employee
productivity, and reduce employee absenteeism and turnover.102  The success of the
codetermination councils has also led to a de facto decentralization of the collective bargaining
process, with many local agreements being established.103
Under the Worker Directors Act, individuals who work for firms with more than twenty-
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five employees can select two or three members of corporate boards of directors.104  Most worker
directors are appointed by the representative unions involved.105  Employee directors are in the
minority and are unable to control board of director decisions.106  Nonetheless, they represent
employee interests and keep union officials informed regarding board proposals of interest to
workers.
5.  European Union Works Councils Directive
In 1994, the European Works Councils Directive was adopted under the Maastricht
Agreement on Social Policy.107 This Directive is currently limited to “Community-scale”
undertakings with at least 1000 employees within EU Member States and with at least 150
employees in at least two Member States. The goal of this Directive is to induce covered
enterprises to establish either European Works Councils or similar procedures that provide
covered workers with relevant firm information and consultation rights. The Directive
encourages voluntary negotiations between employers and workers designed to achieve
agreements on topics of mutual interest.
In an effort to implement the general consultation rights set forth in the 1994 Directive,
the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regualtions 1999 (TICER) have
been issued.108 Company officials, worker representatives, and EU administrators will have to
determine the exact manner in which the Directive and TICER policies are to be effectuated. It is
clear, however, that covered business firms will be obliged to share pertinent information with
employee representatives and consult with European Works Councils or their equivalent with
respect to matters of joint interest. With the passage of time, it is likely that the 1994 Directive
will be extended to smaller firms to provide more employees with consultation rights.
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B. Voluntary United States Practices
Despite the lack of codetermination legislation, a number of American business firms
have historically experimented with different worker participation programs.  During World War
I, the Federal Government encouraged employers to adopt shop committees that would provide
employees with a greater sense of corporate involvement.109  Although most companies initially
opposed such worker participation schemes, some recognized that shop committees could be
used to increase productivity and employee satisfaction.110  Employees could always raise issues
of concern at shop committee meetings and seek an acceptable resolution.  Labor leaders quickly
realized that such worker participation programs were employed by many companies -- not to
provide rank-and-file workers with meaningful influence over their daily job functions -- but as a
means of manipulating worker feelings and discouraging unionization.111  These concerns
ultimately induced Congress to include Section 8(a)(2) in the NLRA to prohibit employer
support for or domination of “labor organizations” which were broadly defined to include
employee committees that dealt with employers regarding grievances, rates of pay, and working
conditions.
During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of American corporations began to appreciate the
potential benefits to be derived from cooperative employee participation programs.  Companies
like General Foods, Harmon Industries, Rushton Mining, and AT & T tried to “humanize” their
production facilities by creating employment environments that provided workers with a
considerable degree to job autonomy.112  The General Motors-U.A.W. Saturn Corporation
“experiment” and the General Motors-Toyota joint venture creating New United Motor and
Manufacturing, Inc. (“NUMMI”) provide more recent examples of successful cooperative
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employer-employee participation programs.113
Many other companies have decided to emulate their foreign competitors and create shop
level committees designed to minimize employee dissatisfaction, enhance product or service
quality, and improve productivity.  A recent study found that 64 percent of firms have established
at lease minimal employee involvement programs,114 while another survey found that 86 percent
of the Fortune 1000 companies have created involvement committees.115  Some of these
programs have been carefully structured to avoid problems under Section 8(a)(2).  They facilitate
employer-employee communication and elicit worker input regarding relevant issues, but attempt
to avoid discussions that would bring their committees within the coverage of that NLRA
provision.116
Other firms have not been so cautious.  They have established joint employee-
management committees that actually resolve worker grievances and negotiate over existing
employment conditions.117  When such programs are created in nonunion environments and are
not used to thwart incipient union organizing efforts, they rarely come to the attention of the
NLRB.  Thousands of shop level committees currently exist, many of which could technically be
challenged under Section 8(a)(2).118  Fortunately for the employers involved, their employees are
either sufficiently pleased with the functioning of these worker participation programs or are
afraid of company reprisals to question the legality of these plans.  Other workers are simply
unaware of the existence of the Section 8(a)(2) prohibition.
The primary difficulty with employer-created participation programs concerns the one-
sided nature of these arrangements.  Managers decide the structure of these plans and the issues
to be addressed, and they generally reserve to themselves the right to determine which committee
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proposals to accept.119  This provides managers with the chance to engage in opportunistic
behavior at the expense of the employees.  For example, when worker participation committees
improve productivity or quality, managers may expropriate all or most of the increased firm
revenues.  They have little incentive to share these gains equitably with their collaborating
workers.  Rarely do the employees possess the power to require gain-sharing as a prerequisite to
the implementation of improved operational procedures.  As a result, employee members of such
committees are often hesitant to recommend changes that may either cause the layoff of
redundant workers or result in increased firm profits that do not inure to the benefit of the
responsible employees.
Some might argue that reputational costs would deter opportunistic managerial behavior,
because companies with bad reputations would find it harder to attract and retain competent
employees.120  Others, however, have questioned the degree to which company reputational
concerns would preclude the excessive expropriation of jointly generated increased profit.121 
Only firms with highly public reputations for egregious opportunistic behavior would suffer any
real negative consequences in this regard, with these negative effects being minimal in times of
high unemployment.122  It is thus doubtful corporate managers would be induced by this factor to
treat employees equitably when they are not required by other considerations to do so.
It is informative to note that a recent nation-wide survey of 2408 workers conducted by
Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 79 percent of individuals involved with
worker participation programs believe they have personally benefitted from those employer-
employee arrangements.123 Over three-quarters of respondents thought that greater worker
empowerment improved firm competitiveness and enhanced the quality of the services or
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products being provided.124  Furthermore, from 69 to 76 percent of surveyed persons without
involvement programs indicated that they would like to have such a collective voice.125  To the
extent these programs increase employee job satisfaction and firm loyalty, workers and their
employers derive important benefits from their existence.
III.  PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY WORKER PARTICIPATION
The time has come to provide rank-and-file employees and lower level managers with
basic employment dignity and true industrial democracy – to allow them to influence decisions
affecting firm success and failure.  This objective can only be accomplished through federal
legislation mandating appropriate employee involvement.  No state could accomplish this goal
within its boundaries without risking the relocation of corporate citizens to other less intrusive
jurisdictions.  A mere modification of the NLRA to limit or eliminate the impact of Section
8(a)(2) would not require firms to create employer-employee committees.  Furthermore, this
narrow change would be used by many companies to create programs selfishly intended to
improve quality and productivity with no corresponding benefit to the affected production and
service personnel.
If meaningful worker participation programs were “voluntary,” few would be created.
American managers who have developed autocratic leadership styles would be hesitant to share
power with subordinate personnel. If worker participation programs could only be established
after a majority of employees voted to have such programs, business leaders would make it clear
– as they presently do with respect to unionization campaigns – that votes in favor of worker
participation plans would undermine firm viability and employee job security. In such coercive
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environments, most individuals would vote against the establishment of real worker participation
plans.
What would ever induce American business leaders to accept a mandatory worker
participation enactment?  First, effective employee involvement programs should enhance
productivity, quality, and employee satisfaction.126  Worker turnover should decline, making it
economically advantageous for corporations to accept the costs associated with greater firm-
specific training.  If worker participation plans functioned optimally, employees would be less
likely to unionize, because they would not perceive a need for external representation.  Second,
mandatory worker participation systems should stem the proliferation of legislative and judicial
intervention in employment relationships.  Through employee involvement committees,
companies could decide issues in a way that best satisfies local interests, instead of having to
comply with national standards governing all employment settings.  In some instances, local
committees could be authorized to oversee compliance with federal and state employment
standards, and even be permitted to grant waivers from those obligations when warranted by
appropriate local circumstances.
Cooperative employee involvement programs would be beneficial for both workers and
employers, because they would open direct channels of communication between employees and
managers.  These committees could insure that the “human aspects” of the work process be
considered during managerial deliberations, and they would provide employees with the
enhanced sense of dignity and respect associated with industrial democracy and the satisfaction
of being able to influence decisions directly affecting their employment destinies.127  In addition,
by decreasing the current information imbalance which permits managers to act opportunistically
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at the expense of information-deprived workers, a greater employer-employee equilibrium would
be created.128
Corporate leaders must realize that their lower-level employees are not ignorant people. 
They usually understand basic operations more thoroughly than upper managers.  Workers are in
an advantageous position to enhance productivity and firm quality, but they are presently hesitant
to do so since such improvements may undermine their job security.  If they were treated as true
corporate partners in a cooperative venture and realized that new developments would not be
permitted to unduly affect their employment rights, they would be more inclined to propose and
support operational changes.
United States corporations that have instituted employee involvement programs have
generally experienced positive results.129 Job satisfaction has improved, and employee
absenteeism and turnover have been reduced.130  Cooperative systems also make it easier for
businesses to respond optimally to economic crises and international competition, because
worker input frequently provides managers with ideas they might not otherwise have considered. 
In addition, employee participation in decision making increases worker support for the final
decisions.
Lower and middle-level managers might initially oppose employee involvement
committees.  The reorganization of work environments through the establishment of joint
employer-employee committees might evoke anxiety among supervisory personnel accustomed
to conventional superior-subordinate relationships between themselves and rank-and-file
workers.131  Managers would have to develop a new style that would motivate employees to
accept their leadership out of respect for their professional expertise rather than fear of their
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disciplinary authority.132  They would have to appreciate the fact that most individuals work
harder to obtain respect and praise than to avoid the negative consequences generated by poor
performance.133
Many labor leaders would oppose mandatory worker participation legislation, because
they fear that employee involvement arrangements would become a substitute for traditional
union representation.  They must recognize, however, that worker participation would not render
labor organizations irrelevant.  Neither shop level committees nor board of director
representatives would be authorized to negotiate over basic wage rates or possess the right to
strike.  In addition, if worker participation programs were to function well, employees might
develop a greater appreciation for the benefits to be derived from collective action.  They might
decide to seek the more expansive involvement that could only be provided through conventional
union representation.
Successful worker participation programs should enhance employee job security and job
satisfaction, and generate more hospitable work environments.134  In addition, with many
fundamental employment issues being subject to consultation with worker representatives,
historical employer opposition to union representation should decline.  Even unorganized firms
would be obliged to consult with worker representatives regarding matters of mutual interest,
reducing the degree to which managerial freedom would be diminished through traditional union
representation.  The cooperative nature of worker participation plans should also moderate the
adversarial nature of conventional collective bargaining, inuring to the benefit of both labor and
management.  The fact that worker performance increases more significantly with employee
involvement programs in union environments than in unorganized settings135 should further
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discourage employer opposition to unionization under a mandatory employee involvement
statute. 
Union officials should support mandatory employee involvement programs,
understanding that labor organizations could continue to perform important functions for
members who worked in settings with such participative arrangements.  Unions could provide
workers with the information and expertise they would need to participate meaningfully in
cooperative worker-management schemes.  Furthermore, unions could continue to use collective
bargaining to enhance employee interests with respect to matters not subject to resolution
through employer-employee committees.136  Labor leaders must realize that cooperative industrial
relations plans could beneficially supplant many of the inefficient practices associated with
conventional adversarial labor-management relationships.137
A. Shop Level Employee Involvement Committees
Congress should enact an employer-employee relations statute similar to the German and
Dutch works council systems.138  Every employer with at least 15 or 25 employees should be
required to create a minimum number of worker involvement committees.  One committee would
be required for each separate facility.  In locations with fewer than 100 workers, these
committees could consist of three to five persons, with establishments with 100 to 250
employees having committees with  five to ten workers.  Mid-sized facilities with over 250
employees could have committees comprised of about ten people, with large installations with
over 1000 employees having fifteen committee members.  Where large facilities are involved, the
law could require employee subcommittees for each distinct department or for each group of
inter-related departments containing employees who share a community of employment
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interest.139  These subgroups could be comprised of three to five representatives.  Multi-plant
firms would be required to establish enterprise-level employee involvement committees
comprised of a specified number of individuals elected by the members of plant level
involvement committees.
Every three or four years, company employees would nominate and elect, in secret ballot
elections, the members of their respective worker involvement committees and subcommittees.140 
To ensure a meaningful dialogue between employees and management and to provide
employment protections for managerial personnel whose employment interests are more aligned
with their subordinates than with their superiors, lower and middle managers would be allowed
to elect one-fifth or one-quarter of employee involvement committees.  To satisfy worker desires
for truly joint employer-employee participation groups,141 Congress may wish to authorize upper
firm managers to appoint one or two involvement committee members who may or may not be
permitted to vote on committee issues.  This would enable worker-elected committee members to
communicate directly with these managerial participants, and allow the managerial agents to
convey to workers the concerns of upper managers.
Even non-traditional workers should be permitted to participate in employee involvement
committee elections and functions.  These would include part-time, temporary, and “independent
contractor” personnel who are increasingly being used by American corporations to avoid the
legal obligations owed to permanent employees.142  Contingent workers with more than short-
term connections to particular firms should enjoy the same employee involvement committee
rights as regular employees.143
Business firms should be legally obliged to provide enterprise and plant level employee
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involvement committees with information regarding basic operations and contemplated changes
that would meaningfully affect working conditions or employee job security to overcome the
information imbalance that has historically existed in private sector employment settings.144 
Proposed corporate changes with respect to basic operations, major new investment plans,
significant market strategies, the introduction of new technology, job restructuring, health and
safety concerns, significant job transfers to other facilities, group layoffs, and individual
terminations would have to be presented to the appropriate employee involvement committee or
subcommittee for consideration.145  Matters of general concern would be assigned to the full
committee, while issues affecting smaller groups of workers could be sent to the relevant
subcommittees.  When fundamental issues would affect the personnel covered by several worker
committees or subcommittees, management should be required to consult jointly with the
relevant committees or subcommittees in an effort to achieve mutually acceptable
accommodations of the competing interests.
In most cases, employee involvement committee members and firm managers would
agree upon the proper course to be taken.  Rank-and-file employees understand the need for
corporate efficiency and increased productivity if employers are to remain competitive in an
increasingly global economy.  They also recognize that superfluous or incompetent personnel
cannot be retained indefinitely without threatening the employment security of all workers. 
Managers would obtain a better comprehension of worker concerns, and would be forced to
appreciate the need to formulate corporate decisions that would maximize worker morale and
loyalty.  
Congress should provide that when a majority -- or perhaps a weighted majority -- of
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worker involvement committee members reject proposed managerial action, a mediator with
business experience previously selected jointly by managers and worker committee members
would work with the parties to achieve a conciliated agreement.  Specific time limits could be
imposed to require the expeditious consideration of controverted topics.  On those occasions in
which mutual accords are not generated within the prescribed time limits, Congress would have
to indicate how the resulting impasses would be resolved.
For matters that directly go to the core of entrepreneurial control, such as those dealing
with basic operations or the direction of the company, an employee involvement committee
disagreement should not be permitted to preclude corporate action.  After firm managers have
consulted with committee members and sincerely participated in the requisite mediation
proceedings, they would be empowered to unilaterally implement their actual proposals.  This
practice would be similar to that currently operational under the NLRA with regard to issues that
constitute mandatory subjects for bargaining.146  Once good faith impasses are achieved,
employers are authorized to implement what they have already offered to representative unions at
the bargaining table.147 To prevent committee stalling tactics designed to undermine the need for
expedited company action, the passage of the prescribed time limit would ipso facto establish the
required “impasse” for the purpose of enabling the firm to make the desired modifications.
If Congress was concerned that disingenuous employers would use impasse-resolution
procedures to determine unilaterally most controversial policies, they could adopt an intermediate
approach.  They could require disputes pertaining to fundamental company policies to be
presented, on an expedited basis, before neutral individuals who would determine the relevant
factual circumstances and propose non-binding options.  These recommendations could then be
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used by the parties to regenerate previously unproductive negotiations.  After the passage of
several days, firm managers would then be authorized to take the final action they deem
appropriate.  
Resort to mediation and fact-finding procedures should be mandated with respect to
proposed management changes that do not go to the core of entrepreneurial control but that
would significantly affect worker job security and/or basic employment conditions.  The minimal
infringement of managerial authority in these areas of joint worker-management interest is
necessary to provide employees with reasonable participation in the firm decision-making
process.  These steps would force corporate officials to consider worker interests and employee,
mediator, and fact-finder suggestions they may not have previously contemplated.
When firm officials fail to consult with employee involvement committees over proposed
decisions that would affect employee interests, Congress should authorize district courts – or an
administrative agency like the NLRB -- to enjoin corporate action with respect to those decisions
until meaningful consultation has occurred.  When appropriate, courts should also be empowered
to require sincere corporate participation in mandated mediation and fact-finding proceedings
before final company decisions are effectuated.  Congress might also authorize the imposition of
monetary sanctions on repeat offenders.
The relatively brief delays that would be associated with the need for employee
involvement committee consultation would be more than counterbalanced by the efficacy of
better informed managerial decision-making and a greater commitment to final determinations by
the affected employees.  Studies have shown that works council consultation improves the
quality of the resulting decisions.148  Firm managers obtain more complete information and are
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induced to analyze the relevant factors in an optimal manner.149  This redounds to the benefit of
all concerned parties.
Disagreements over employee dismissals would be subject to different impasse resolution
procedures.  If management negotiations with employee involvement committee members do not
generate agreement and mediation efforts are unsuccessful, the dispute should be submitted to
arbitration for final resolution.  The arbitrators would be jointly selected by managers and
committee members.  To protect the right of firms to rid themselves of marginal or disruptive
personnel, Congress could reject the traditional labor-management practice of requiring
employers to demonstrate “just cause” for termination decisions.150  The burden of persuasion
could instead be placed upon the adversely affected employees to establish the absence of any
reasonable basis for their discharge.  Since rational employers do not dismiss workers without
justification, such a limited review procedure would not unduly restrict managerial freedom.  It
would merely curtail terminations that were not based on just cause or were imposed for
improper reasons.
Congress could reduce federal and state regulatory costs by authorizing employee
involvement committees to supervise the enforcement of health and safety regulations, wage and
hour laws, family and medical leave provisions, and other similar employment legislation. 
Regular committee monitoring would be far more effective than sporadic inspections conducted
on rare occasions by understaffed federal and state agencies.  Furthermore, employee
involvement committees could be empowered to grant waivers from unnecessarily strict federal
and state employment regulations that would reflect local firm circumstances and not dilute or
undermine worker interests.  Involvement committees could be allowed to grant safety and health
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rule variances and permit the substitution of compensatory time off for the monetary overtime
payments currently mandated by federal and state wage and hour laws.  These practices would be
cost effective from a regulatory perspective, and would more thoroughly protect the statutory
rights of the affected employees.
Employee discrimination claims arising under state and federal civil rights enactments
could be subject to employee involvement committee review and resulting arbitral determination
before they could be considered by state or federal courts.151  Involvement committee
participation would enhance the likelihood of amicable resolutions, and most required arbitral
determinations would be accepted by losing parties without the need for further proceedings.  In
those relatively few instances in which these procedures failed to generate final dispositions,
resulting judicial involvement could be minimized through the court acceptance of arbitral fact
determinations generated by appropriate proceedings and supported by adequate records.152 
Legal conclusions should, however, be subject to de novo judicial determination.
Corporate officials required to share confidential firm information with employee
involvement committee or subcommittee members might reasonably fear the public disclosure of
that information.  To minimize this risk, Congress should forbid the disclosure of confidential
information by committee or subcommittee members, and impose severe criminal and/or civil
penalties on violators.  Such a restriction would merely acknowledge the injury that could be
caused to both the company and its workers by the thoughtless or malicious disclosure of trade
secrets or confidential proprietary information.
Employee involvement committee participants (and worker-elected board of director
members) would enjoy access to firm financial information relevant to the determination of
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employee wage and benefit increases.  While they would have the right to express worker views
regarding these important matters, they should not be authorized to engage in conventional
collective bargaining over general employee compensation levels or be permitted to conduct
work stoppages over employment disputes.153  If they were given these expansive rights,
traditional labor organizations would be rendered superfluous.  If employees desire these
expansive prerogatives, they should select a formal bargaining representative.
Despite the lack of collective bargaining rights, involvement committees should have the
right to negotiate about incentive wage increases or gain-sharing that might be granted to
particular individuals or groups of workers as a result of their increased productivity or other
cost-saving innovations.  If such performance-based remuneration issues could not be discussed,
involvement committee members would be reluctant to suggest operational improvements that
would only be of financial benefit to managers and shareholders at the expense of the responsible
workers.  The availability of gain-sharing discussions would encourage the disclosure of
employee-developed cost saving measures, and prevent the opportunistic managerial
expropriation of worker-generated savings.
Some management officials will undoubtedly consider my proposal for the creation of
employee involvement committees radical. Individuals with an international perspective,
however, will consider my proposal unduly modest, given the much broader codetermination
rights enjoyed by works councils in countries like Germany. Given the conservative nature of
American business and congressional leaders, I am certain that full codetermination rights would
have no chance of enactment. On the other hand, given the broad legislative support for the
TEAM Act and the fact my proposal for mandated employee involvement committees is not a
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significant departure from what many U.S. corporations are already doing, I hope that political
and business leaders will acknowledge the need for legislative action of the level I have proposed
if we want to provide American workers with a minimal degree of industrial democracy.
B.  Board of Director Participation
Shop level employee involvement committees could not provide workers with full
participation rights.  While those committees would significantly increase employee input with
respect to daily decisions affecting their employment destinies, they could not affect the
fundamental decisions made at the top of corporate hierarchies.  If workers are to have the
capacity to influence upper management deliberations, they must be provided with board of
director representation.154
In a new employer-employee relations act, Congress should mandate the election of one-
quarter or one-third of corporate board members by non-executive personnel.  Both rank-and-file
employees and lower level managers should be authorized to nominate and vote for worker
representatives.  This would guarantee board consideration of worker interests when important
firm policies are debated.  Where relevant, these board members could offer alternative proposals
that would have a less devastating impact on employee interests.
Employee-elected board members should not merely serve the interests of workers. These
board members and those elected by shareholders should have a dual fiduciary duty.  They
should be obliged to consider both shareholder and worker interests when they make business
decisions,155 and they should be subject to liability to either employees or shareholders when they
violate their fiduciary obligation to either group.156
Some people might suggest that employee-elected board members should only owe a
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fiduciary duty to the workers who elected them, with shareholder-elected representatives having
a duty solely to the stockholders.157  This bifurcated approach would continue the outmoded
adversarial manager-worker relationships of the past and generate constant intraboard power
struggles that would undermine corporate viability.158  Requiring all board members to be
responsible to both shareholders and workers would encourage all board members to work
together in a cooperative effort to optimize the long-term interests of both groups.
This proposal would clearly expand the duties that have historically been imposed on
corporate leaders.  In the early 1900s, the Michigan Supreme Court succinctly described the
monolithic duty owed by corporate board members to the shareholders.
A business corporation is organized and carried out primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. . . [I]t
is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of
a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefiting others.159
This narrow view of board of director loyalty was reinforced by the influential scholarship of
Professors Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner C. Means.160 There was a concern that if multiple and
possibly conflicting loyalties were imposed on corporate directors, they would be unable to
maximize firm profits and stockholder returns.161  In more recent years, however, courts,
legislatures, and scholars have begun to question this single-minded fiduciary duty model.
Some court decisions have acknowledged the right of board members to consider non-
shareholder interests when they make managerial decisions.  For example, in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,162 the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that board members of a buy out
target could consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”163  Such decisions provide
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board members with the discretion to consider non-shareholder interests when they reasonably
conclude that those other concerns should be taken into account.  
A number of state legislatures have adopted “constituency statutes” that permit -- but do
not require -- board members to weigh non-stockholder concerns when deciding the future
direction of their firm.  The Minnesota law is typical:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering the
best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation’s
employees, customers, suppliers and creditors, the economy of the state and nation,
community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.164
Over the past ten to fifteen years, downsizing has become an organizational mantra for
many corporate leaders, resulting in the layoff of millions of American workers.165  Some of
these firm reductions have been required by economic exigencies and/or changing consumer
demands.166  When true business factors dictate employer restructuring, it would be irresponsible
to argue in favor of the continued employment of superfluous workers.  Such an approach would
jeopardize the continued viability of the company and the future positions of the other
employees.  This reality does not mean, however, that worker interests should be ignored when
these decisions are being made.  Board members and CEOs should be legally obligated to
consider non-layoff cost-reduction options before they decide to implement significant
reductions.  Even when layoffs are necessary, firm officials should be required to soften the
impact of these reductions on the affected personnel.  Retraining and relocation possibilities
should be explored to determine whether loyal employees could be transferred to other useful
positions.  Severance packages could cushion the adverse consequences for individuals who must
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actually lose their jobs.
Many corporate reductions appear to be motivated more by a desire to temporarily -- and
often artificially -- boost stock prices than by long-term economic or operational
considerations.167  As company officials announce expansive cost-cutting measures and the
concomitant mass layoffs, share prices rise.  Stockholders are gratified by the increased paper
value of their holdings, and corporate executives are rewarded by bonus payments and/or the
opportunity to exercise generous stock options.168 When the announced employee reductions are
excessive, former personnel are often reemployed as outside contractors or consultants, thus
reducing the true economic benefit of the proclaimed cut-backs.169  It is unlikely that these former
workers will ever demonstrate the commitment to firm success that they would have shown had
they been continued in their previous positions.  As a result, the long-term benefits of these
pseudo-reductions are highly speculative.
Other corporate machinations similarly threaten employee interests.  Large business
enterprises regularly restructure their holdings through mergers, sales, or acquisitions that ignore
the negative impact of these changes on firm personnel.170 If board members and CEOs were
required to consider worker interests before they decided to implement such restructuring
programs, they might either forego those changes not motivated by rational business needs or
negotiate contractual terms with corporate partners that protect employee interests.  For example,
selling firms could require purchasing companies to retain the employees of the acquired entities
for a minimal period of time, or one or both concerns could agree to retrain and relocate the
displaced personnel.171
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The contemporary corporation is no longer a wholly private entity that primarily affects a
limited group of shareholders, customers, employees, and the contiguous community.  Large
domestic and transnational enterprises have a “profound effect on the lives of a variety of groups
not traditionally within the corporate law structure.”172  By expanding the fiduciary duties of
corporate leaders to at least include those most directly affected by fundamental company
changes, Congress or state legislatures could greatly enhance the public interest.  When wholly
selfish decisions are made that ignore appropriate constituent interests, legal liability should be
imposed.
Even though statutory provisions should recognize the dual loyalties owed by all board
members to shareholders and to workers, board members must enjoy sufficient discretion to
enable them to make good faith managerial decisions when stockholder and employee interests
conflict without fear of personal liability.  Statutory codification of the established “business
judgment” rule should provide board members with adequate freedom to act on controversial
proposals.173  Corporate officials who could demonstrate that challenged decisions were designed
to achieve legitimate business purposes and that the interests of adversely affected constituencies
were fairly considered would be immune from liability.174  On the other hand, when they wholly
fail to consider worker interests and/or act to serve selfish personal or shareholder interests,
board members should be subject to the same legal accountability that would result if they
currently failed to respect the interests of stockholders.175
Although Congress may wish to treat closely-held corporations differently, because of the
limited number of shareholders associated with such ventures,176 these business entities should be
treated the same as publicly-held corporations.  While the directors of closely-held firms owe a
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heightened fiduciary duty to the narrow group of stockholders,177 they should simultaneously be
obliged to consider employee interests when they make managerial decisions that affect
employment conditions.  When they fail to give adequate consideration to the interests of
employees, they should be subject to the same liability as directors of publicly-held corporations
who ignore worker concerns.
C.  Role of Unions in a Worker Participation System
Labor organizations would not be rendered obsolete through the adoption of a national
employer-employee relations act mandating the creation of worker participation programs.  They
would continue to provide employees with the assistance and training they would need when
dealing with employee involvement committees or corporate boards.  Unions should have the
right to nominate employee slates for employee involvement committee positions and board of
director membership.  Employer agents should be prohibited from coercing or restraining
employees with respect to the nomination and election of involvement committee or corporate
board members.  This would significantly diminish firm conduct designed to undermine free and
fair worker elections.
If a majority or super-majority (e.g., 60 percent) of employee-elected involvement
committee members were affiliated with a particular labor organization, that entity could be
granted exclusive bargaining rights similar to those currently enjoyed by majority bargaining
agents under the NLRA.178  If no labor organization enjoyed such support, each union with 20,
25, or 30 percent employee-elected involvement committee member support could be entitled to
formal consultation rights.179  Since employees may vote for union-nominated involvement
committee members for reasons unrelated to any desire for formal collective bargaining rights,
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the statute could alternatively provide a separate ballot choice to allow workers to express their
interest in bargaining representation.  
When they vote to elect involvement committee members, this separate ballot option
could be used to determine whether a majority of employees wish to be represented by a
particular labor organization, and, if not, whether any specified union had sufficient support to be
entitled to consultation rights.  To be included in such a representational vote, a labor
organization would have to obtain the traditional thirty percent “showing-of-interest”180 from a
group of employees sharing a sufficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit,181 with these issues continuing to be determined by the National Labor Relations
Board.
Firm managers would be required to consult with representatives from each organization
that achieved consultation rights before they made final decisions with respect to matters
affecting employee interests.  Even though formal bargaining would not be required, these
minority entities would provide managers with critical input.  They would articulate employee
concerns and propose options that would be less injurious to worker interests.  Labor
organizations with consultation rights that are not consulted regarding matters of employee
interest should be able to petition a district court for injunctive orders precluding the
implementation of contemplated firm action before corporate officials satisfy their obligation to
discuss these matters with appropriate union representatives.  
Labor organizations with consultation rights would not be empowered to engage in
traditional collective bargaining nor be permitted to conduct work stoppages.  Employees
violating this principle would be subject to summary discharge, and responsible labor
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organizations would forfeit their existing consultative status.  Since consultative labor
organizations would not possess the power to block proposed management action, union leaders
would have to recognize the need to establish sufficiently cooperative relationships with
management officials to guarantee meaningful consideration of union suggestions.  Adversarial
behavior would be antithetical to real employer-employee cooperation, thus I would expect labor
officials to seek mutually respectful relationships that would optimally further worker and
corporate interests.  Union leaders who try to convert consultation into full collective bargaining
or to continue antiquated adversarial practices would find themselves unable to meaningfully
influence corporate actions.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The NLRA was intended to provide American workers with a meaningful degree of
industrial democracy through the collective bargaining process.  Following the enactment of that
statute, union membership expanded rapidly and bargaining agreements effectively advanced
employee interests.  During the past several decades, however, union membership has declined to
9 percent of private sector personnel.  The other 91 percent of workers have no ability to
influence corporate decisions that significantly affect their employment destinies.
In most European countries, legislative enactments promote industrial democracy through
both local level works councils and employee-elected members of corporate boards.  It is time to
acknowledge that collective bargaining is unlikely to further the interests of most American
employees.  If they are to enjoy a modicum of industrial democracy, Congress must explore
alternative avenues of worker input.  Most U.S. firms have voluntarily established shop level
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participation committees that are primarily designed to enhance productivity and quality.  Even
though these programs have been used narrowly, most have generated beneficial results.
American companies have sought NLRA amendments that would expand their right to
create voluntary quality of work life committees.  If these institutions are to fairly protect worker
interests, they should be regulated by federal statute.  Covered firms should be obliged to
establish local employee involvement committees that would have the right to see relevant
company financial information and to be consulted regarding proposed changes that would
significantly affect employee interests.  Mediation and fact-finding procedures could be used to
encourage the mutual resolution of conflicts between involvement committee members and
management officials.  Wrongful terminations should be proscribed and be subject to employee
involvement committee consideration and, when necessary, external arbitral review.
Rank-and-file employees and lower level managers should be given the right to elect one-
third or one-quarter of corporate board members.  Both worker-elected and shareholder-elected
board members should be obliged to consider fairly the rights of both employees and
stockholders when they determine basic firm policies.  Directors who fail to satisfy this dual
fiduciary duty should be subject to civil liability.  On the other hand, board members who
exercise their managerial judgment in a rational manner to achieve legitimate business objectives
and who carefully consider competing employee and shareholder interests before they act should
be immune from liability.
Labor organizations that are unable to achieve majority support but do generate 20, 25, or
30 percent employee support should be granted consultation rights.  While consultative unions
would not have the right to strike or be empowered to demand conventional collective
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bargaining, they would be granted access to relevant firm information and have the right to be
consulted before employers implement policies that would directly affect worker interests.
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